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1.- Introduction 
 
An extensive theoretical and empirical literature in the heterodox economics 
tradition (HET hereafter) has addressed the impact on unemployment of changes in the 
functional distribution of income stemming from a change in the average degree of 
monopoly.1 In this literature, it is commonly postulated that an increase in the wage 
(profit) share in national income has contradictory effects on the different subaggregates 
of aggregate demand so its net effect is ambiguous. In general, this literature takes for 
granted that the level of economic activity is demand-determined in the short and the 
long run and thus ignores (i) the existence of a short-term “inflation barrier” determined 
by the conflict over income distribution between workers and firms, (ii) the impact of 
changes in the degree of monopoly as captured by changes in the average mark up on 
both the “inflation barrier” and the inflation rate in the short run, and (iii) that a salient 
feature of the institutional framework that characterizes most present-day economies is 
that central banks (CBs hereafter) set short-term nominal interest rates in order to 
achieve an inflation target. When taking all these features into account, it seems to us 
that it is hardly realistic to study the implications of changes in the degree of monopoly 
by leaving aside their impact on the supply-side of the economy and, due to their short-
run impact on the inflation rate, on real interest rates.  
In the last decade or so we have witnessed the emergence of the so-called “New 
Consensus” on Macroeconomics (NC hereafter)2. The NC has been summarised in 
terms of a simple model with three equations: (i) an aggregate demand equation with 
the output-gap typically determined by past and expected future output-gap and the ex-
ante real interest rate, (ii) a short-run Phillips curve with inflation typically based on 
current output-gap and past and future inflation and (iii) a monetary policy rule of the 
Taylor´s rule form that endogenises the setting of interest rates by the CB. The NC 
strongly suggests that there is no long-run trade-off between inflation and 
unemployment and that, as a result of it, inflation can be conveniently tamed though 
interest rate policy using aggregate demand deflation. Unlike the literature referred to 
above, the NC tends to ignore the impact of the functional income distribution on 
unemployment. There are (at least) two reasons for this. First and foremost, mainstream 
economics has traditionally skipped the analysis of a class-ridden socio-economic 
structure and, hence, the possibility that different social groups have different sources of 
income and different propensities to spend out of income. Arguably, this is related to 
the adoption of “methodological individualism” as a key principle of the Neoclassical 
Research Programme. Second, proponents of the NC approach tend to view the level of 
economic activity as hovering in the short run around a supply-determined equilibrium 
that is assumed to be largely independent of the level and time path of aggregate 
demand. This supply-determined equilibrium is referred to as the “natural rate of 
unemployment” or as the NAIRU, the acronym for “non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment”. This study represents an attempt to construct a general framework that 
encompasses both the HET and the NC as particular cases and to explore its 
implications for unemployment. To be sure, it incorporates some features of the HET by 
assuming there are different social groups with different sources of income (i.e., wages 
and profits) and hysteresis effects, and by adopting Keynesian liquidity preference (LP 
hereafter) theory. Likewise, it incorporates some key features of the NC as the existence 
of an “inflation barrier” and an inflation-targeting CB that sets interest rates.               
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Economists have recently used the concept of hysteresis especially in the field of 
unemployment theory since its properties seem to fit well the unemployment dynamics 
of the last three decades, especially in Western Europe. For instance, Ball (1999) 
suggests that passive macroeconomic policies are largely to blame for the observed rise 
in unemployment in several OECD countries since 1985. In countries where policy 
shifted toward expansion after tight policy had disinflated the economy, unemployment 
rose only temporarily. By contrast, in those countries where policy remained tight 
unemployment rose permanently (Ball, 1999, p. 190). Ball blames for this outcome to 
the presence of hysteresis effects that operated through the impact on “equilibrium 
unemployment” of the fraction of the long-term unemployed. Despite an initial wave of 
studies that lent empirical support to the notion of hysteresis (see the survey in RØed, 
1997), the subsequent emergence of controversial evidence in the nineties, especially 
for North America, led to an apparent loss of interest in this concept. However, several 
recent contributions have reopened the debate on the notion of hysteresis. For instance, 
León-Ledesma (2002) finds strong support for this hypothesis for the EU countries. 
Likewise, Logeay and Tober (2006) find strong support for the existence of hysteresis 
in the Euro Area.   
 There is now a strong body of evidence indicating the presence of “downward 
money wage rigidity” (hereafter DMWR) across a wide spectrum of countries (see 
Lebow et al., 2003, Akerlof, 2007, Holden, 2004 and Holden and Wulfsberg, 2008). 
Several explanations have been put forward for the existence of such rigidities, such as 
fairness and social norms (Bewley, 1999, and Akerlof, 2007) or labour market 
institutions (Holden, 2004). The combination of these factors implies that these nominal 
rigidities could persist for a long time even in a low inflation environment. Indeed, 
empirical studies for European countries find that DMWR persist during low inflation 
periods (Agell and Lundburg, 2003 and Fehr and Lorenz, 2005). Similarly, the recent 
Japanese experience shows that, despite the presence of a large negative output-gap for 
most of the period 1991-2002, inflation turned negative in the second half of the 1990s 
but, after 1998, core inflation remained stable at moderately negative levels reaching its 
trough at -0.79 percent in 2002 (De Veirman, 2007).3 The presence of DMWR and the 
recent Japanese experience suggest that, when the output-gap becomes negative and 
inflation is low or negative, the former is likely to manifest itself in the existence of 
“asymmetric inflation dynamics” (AID hereafter) in the sense that inflation decreases 
more sluggishly when the output-gap is negative and inflation is relatively low than it 
increases when the output-gap is positive.4  
According to us, the main contributions of this study are the following. First, we 
find that, in an economy characterized by the presence of an inflation-targeting CB and 
a short-run “inflation barrier” that exhibits hysteresis effects, a change in the average 
mark up affects the employment rate in the long run through the initial impact on the 
“inflation barrier” and the inflation rate. In particular, an increase in the mark up leads 
to a long-run decrease in the employment rate and vice-versa. Second, we show that, 
when the economy also exhibits AID, a change in the average mark up is less effective 
and may lead to a long-run fall in the employment rate even when it contracts. This is 
because the long-run impact on the employment rate of the demand shock, even when it 
is expansionary, is adverse owing to the presence of AID. Therefore, in this second 
scenario, a contraction in the average mark up only brings about a long-run increase in 
the employment rate if the net long-run adverse effect of the demand shock (even when 
the latter is expansionary) is more than offset by the sum of the favourable effects 
stemming from the initial fall in the inflation rate and the attenuation of the “inflation 
barrier”. More generally, we show that the joint presence of hysteresis effects and AID 
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in the economy (i) helps attenuate macroeconomic volatility and (ii) blocks off the 
“reversibility” property typically exhibited by zero/unit root systems. Third, we find 
that, in the above scenario, whether the economy exhibits a “wage-led” or a “profit-led” 
macroeconomic regime is largely irrelevant for macroeconomic performance as long as 
the economy does not exhibit an “aggregate demand deficiency”. Fourth, we show that, 
despite the previous results, a change in the functional distribution of income may 
nevertheless impinge favourably on macroeconomic performance if it raises the steady 
growth neutral interest rate since this reduces the likelihood that an aggregate demand 
deficiency occurs. Lastly, we identify a Keynesian and a Neoclassical regime according 
to whether an increase in the actual inflation rate leads to an increase (Keynesian) or to 
a decrease (Neoclassical) in the neutral interest rate and show that the regime the 
economy exhibits affects the stability conditions of the economy.  
The study continues as follows. The following section proposes a definition of 
an aggregate demand deficiency problem, reviews the NC approach and compares its 
predictions to those of LP theory. We then present a simple model for a closed economy 
with a government sector. We work out its steady-growth properties and short-run 
behaviour. The analysis of the dynamics associated to demand and inflation shocks 
follows and the final section summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
2.- Aggregate demand deficiencies and the New Consensus approach  
It is well-known that short-term nominal interest rates are subject to a zero lower 
bound constraint. This feature was termed by Kaldor (1939) the ‘great constitutional 
weakness’ of monetary policy because it prevents the short-term nominal interest rate 
from operating equally freely in both directions. In the context of this study, the 
relevance of the zero lower bound constraint stems from the fact that, if the CB fine-
tunes the economy through changes in interest rates, then an inadequate functional 
distribution of income may bring about an aggregate demand deficiency problem so that 
the functional distribution of income will affect macroeconomic performance. We 
define the former as a scenario where, with nominal interest rates at or near zero, the CB 
is unable to push down real interest rates far enough so as to induce a level of output 
equal to potential output.5  
We define the neutral interest rate rn  as the long-term real interest rate which is 
neutral with respect to the inflation rate and tends neither to raise nor to lower it in the 
absence of transitory supply shocks6. In a closed economy with a government sector, 
there will be an aggregate demand deficiency when planned aggregate saving exceeds 
the sum of planned private investment plus the government budget deficit at the 
employment rate consistent with constant inflation even at a zero short-term nominal 
interest rate. If we denote by ω  the minimum (ex-ante) real interest rate that a CB can 
set then the economy will exhibit an aggregate demand deficiency problem if: 
                                                  ωprn                                                          (1)    
If we think of r as a short-term real interest rate then the minimum (short-term) 
nominal interest rate that the CB can set is zero. By contrast, if we think of r as a long-
term real interest rate, the minimum (long-term) nominal interest rate that the CB can 
set is positive because lenders will normally require a (time-varying) term/risk premium 
0fμ  to grant credit or purchase long-dated securities.7 In turn, the size of the 
term/risk premium will depend positively on the degree of LP. If we assume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that the expected rate of inf tion la π e  equals the current inflation rate 
π  we have: 
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                                                                                                  (2)                                   πμπμω −=−= e
Therefore, we say that an economy exhibits an aggregate demand deficiency if: 
                                                           μπ p+rn                                                       (3) 
Expression (3) tells us that the lower are rn  and π , and the higher is μ  the 
more likely it is that an economy that is hit by a shock that pushes either π  or rn  (or 
both) down will exhibit an aggregate demand deficiency. If this is the case, then the 
current level of output will be lower than potential output and inflation will tend to fall.  
A number of mainstream economists have recently evaluated the likelihood of 
economies exhibiting an aggregate demand deficiency and the policy options that may 
remove this constraint should it be necessary. A summary of the former is in Blinder 
(2000) and an evaluation of the different proposals is in Bernanke and Reinhart (2004). 
There seems to be an emerging consensus on the view that the existence of a zero lower 
bound constraint on nominal interest rates will lead to a moderate deterioration in 
macroeconomic volatility as the inflation target approaches zero so it represents a 
constraint on how monetary policy operates in a low inflation environment (Fuhrer and 
Madigan, 1997; Reifschneider and Williams, 2000). One aspect these studies address is 
the possibility that an economy enters a deflationary episode once the zero lower bound 
constraint binds. The verdict is ‘that such episodes are fairly rare, even in a low-
inflation environment ― about once every hundred years if the target rate of inflation is 
around zero, given the sort of shocks that have characterized the U.S. economy over the 
past thirty years’ (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, p. 962). Thus, the conclusion is 
that a deflationary episode may come about only in the wake of unusually large shocks. 
The studies also recommend setting a low but positive inflation target (preferably 2 per 
cent). Conversely, there is no consensus as to whether unconventional monetary policy 
options can take the economy out of a deflationary episode should it be necessary. Yet, 
as argued in Reifschneider and Williams (2000, p. 943), a summary of the debate is that 
‘the likely effectiveness of such actions is unclear from a theoretical perspective, and 
they have never been put to a definitive test’. Only discretionary fiscal policy is viewed 
as a reliable weapon once the zero lower bound constraint binds (Kuttner and Posen, 
2001, pp. 124-140). In this respect, the words of Kazuo Ueda at the 1999 JMCB 
Conference serve to summarize the conventional wisdom on this subject: ‘Don’t put 
yourself in the position of zero interest rates. You’ll have to face a lot of difficulties. I 
can tell you it will be a lot more painful than you can possibly imagine’ (Ueda, 2000, 
p.1109).  
The predominant wisdom in the mainstream literature that a deflationary episode 
may only occur in the wake of unusually large shocks appears to be consistent with the 
theoretical predictions of the NC approach. In the influential study by Woodford (2003) 
which, for the purposes of this study, will be taken as the canonical version of the NC 
approach, he develops a neo-Wicksellian framework based on explicit optimizing 
foundations where the deviation of the natural interest rate from its steady growth value 
is a stochastic process determined by a range of demand and supply shocks (Woodford, 
2003, pp. 249-51). In his model, demand shocks include fiscal policy, investment and 
impatience shocks. The latter modify the rate of time preference of the representative 
household. Supply shocks consist of productivity shocks to the production function of 
the firms, shocks to the disutility-of-labour function and changes in the amount of 
capital. He concludes that real ‘interest rates must increase in response to temporary 
increases in government purchases or in the impatience of households to consume and 
decrease in response to temporary increases in productivity or in the willingness of 
households to supply labor’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 250). He defines the natural interest 
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rate as ‘the equilibrium real rate of return in the case of fully flexible prices’ (Woodford, 
2003, p. 248). Crucially, he admits the possibility that a range of transitory shocks may 
make the natural interest rate negative, albeit he suggests that this will be a transitory 
scenario:   
 
‘The present theory allows for variation over time in the natural rate for a variety 
of reasons, and there is no reason why it should not sometimes be negative. (The model 
does imply a positive average level of the natural rate, determined by the rate of time 
preference of the representative household)’ (Woodford, 2003, p. 251).   
 
We may extrapolate Woodford´s results to a growing economy by relying on 
optimal growth theory. According to it, the optimality condition for saving yields the 
following “balanced growth” condition: 
                                            ϑσ ++= n
a
r*                                                     (i) 
where r*  is the natural interest rate in steady-growth, a is the rate of labour-augmenting 
technological change, n is the rate of population growth, σ  is the inter-temporal 
elasticity of substitution in consumption and ϑ  is the rate of time preference of the 
representative household.8 a and n are positive in a growing economy. Hence, the 
natural interest rate will be positive in steady growth and its lower bound will be ϑ . 
Finally, in the stationary state we have that 0== na  and, hence, ϑ=r* .  
Several comments are in order. First, the literature seems to conflate different 
meanings of the notion of a natural interest rate.9 This problem was recognized long 
time ago by Myrdal (1939) who noted that monetary equilibrium in Wicksell´s theory 
entails that the natural rate of interest must (i) equal the marginal productivity of real 
capital, (ii) equate the supply and the demand for savings at full employment and, (iii) 
guarantee a stable price level. Only the third meaning is compatible with our previous 
definition of the neutral interest rate albeit it needs to be adapted to a modern setting 
where it is the inflation rate and not the price level that is stable in the long run.10 This 
is because (i) we will assume that the economy operates in the long run at an 
employment rate that is equal (or lower) than the rate of employment compatible with a 
constant inflation rate and this, in turn, corresponds to an employment rate that falls 
short of full employment and (ii) the notion of the marginal productivity of capital is 
flawed (see Harcourt, 1969). Furthermore, there is nothing natural about the natural 
interest rate since it depends, inter alia, on the government budget balance and so we 
think that the term “neutral” is preferable. Be that as it may, the role of the natural 
interest rate in the NC approach is equivalent to the role of the neutral interest rate as 
defined above, namely, it is the real interest rate that renders the inflation rate constant 
in the absence of transitory supply shocks or as Woodford (2003, p. 248) notes ‘the 
natural rate of interest is just the real rate of interest required to keep aggregate demand 
equal at all times to the natural rate of output’.   
Second, Woodford´s assumption that the average value of the natural interest 
rate is positive implies that the natural interest rate returns in the long-run to a positive 
gravitation centre provided prices are fully flexible. The process whereby this occurs is 
not discussed in Woodford (2003). Presumably, the argument is that, in a hypothetical 
situation where actual output equals potential output and, in the absence of shocks,  
economic agents will increase their saving rate whenever the actual real interest rate is 
above their rate of time preference and vice-versa so that, in equilibrium, the former will 
necessarily equal the latter. The adjustment process can be put forward as follows. Let 
us assume that the economy initially exhibits an aggregate demand deficiency problem 
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so that the actual real interest rate exceeds the natural interest rate. If so, inflation will 
start to fall. Since the actual real interest rate (which may be negative) falls short of the 
average rate of time preference (which is positive), households will increase their 
consumption so the natural interest rate will increase. This process will continue as long 
as the actual real interest rate falls short of the rate of time preference. Eventually, the 
actual real interest rate and the natural interest rate will converge to the average rate of 
time preference and the economy will reach equilibrium. However, this story faces (at 
least) one problem; as recognized by most proponents of the NC approach, the economy 
may end up caught in a deflationary spiral if the initial decrease in the inflation rate 
endogenously raises the level of the real rate so as to cause aggregate demand to weaken 
and push inflation down more, thereby raising the real interest rate even further. 
Therefore, if a deflationary spiral is to be avoided, proponents of the NC approach need 
to assume that the adjustment process described above will not be short-circuited by the 
adverse effect upon aggregate demand of a rising actual real interest rate. However, the 
possibility that, under certain circumstances, a deflationary spiral may set off is readily 
recognized by proponents of the NC approach so the main theme of our critique to this 
story needs to rely on a different argument.  
We believe that the specific PK critique of the adjustment process described 
above is that the latter may be short-circuited for reasons other than a deflationary 
spiral. PK theorists insist that individuals make decisions in an environment intrinsically 
characterized by “fundamental uncertainty” where probability distributions cannot be 
the basis for comprehending real world behaviour because they simply do not know all 
the possible future outcomes and, hence, they cannot attach a probability to them 
(Davidson, 1991). Consequently, individuals´ decisions concerning saving, investment 
and the allocation of wealth among alternative assets will tend to be dominated by LP 
considerations. To see this, we may note that, in PK theory, the real interest rate is the 
reward obtained for parting with liquidity rather than (as in neoclassical theory) the 
reward for postponing consumption. In turn, the degree of LP is positively related to the 
degree of uncertainty (Keynes, 1937, p. 216). PK theorists thus identify the notion of LP 
with an environment of “fundamental uncertainty” where the degree of LP is inversely 
related to the degree of confidence. Crucially, they claim that, if investors´ expectations 
are such that they expect that the holding of real or financial assets other than money 
will make them incur in large capital losses then, there is a rationale for placing wealth 
in a liquid asset or, alternatively, to use the former to repay outstanding debt. If so, they 
will postpone consumption plans and increase the liquidity of portfolios. Furthermore, 
PK theorists insist that reduced LP accompanies conditions which are conducive to 
increases in economic activity and vice-versa. Thus, within a generalized LP theory, a 
decrease in aggregate demand may be the result of a high degree of LP associated to 
pessimistic expectations and vice-versa or: 
 
‘A world of ultimate liquidity preference is a world where firms would refuse to 
produce for fear of indebtedness, where banks would refuse to lend for fear of loan 
defaults, and where consumers would refuse to spend for fear of unemployment’ 
(Lavoie, 1996, p. 292).  
 
The existence of “fundamental uncertainty” will thus tend to dominate saving 
and investment decisions even if we assume that households exhibit a subjective rate of 
time preference. In particular, if households are pessimistic about the future, they may 
well decide to increase their saving rate even if the actual real interest rate falls short of 
their rate of time preference thus reducing aggregate demand. In addition, an increase in 
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the degree of LP of banks will make them reluctant to grant credit and this will also tend 
to depress aggregate demand. More generally, the adjustment process posited above 
only applies to a situation where uncertainty is akin to the notion of probabilistic risk. 
For the purposes of this study, the crucial implication is that the steady growth neutral 
interest rate may be negative and will not possess a (positive) centre of gravitation as 
envisaged in the NC approach. 
Lastly, proponents of the NC approach apparently argue that an aggregate 
demand deficiency problem may only come about when the neutral interest rate is 
negative. However, expression (3) reflects that an aggregate demand deficiency problem 
may also occur in a situation where both the neutral interest rate and the inflation rate 
are positive. This may be the case if the term/risk premium on loan rates becomes large 
enough so as to satisfy condition (3). The importance of the term/risk premium is 
recognized in Blinder (2006, pp. 47-48) when he notes that ‘long rates are terrible (and 
biased) predictors of future short rates… Just why this is so remains a major intellectual 
puzzle’. Yet, he does not link the size of the term/risk premium to the degree of LP. 
Likewise, Woodford (2003, p. 244) notes that ‘it is a long-term real rate of interest 
rather than a short rate, that determines aggregate demand in this model’ and he refers to 
agents´ expectations about future short-term real interest rates as an important 
determinant of aggregate demand but he does not mention the possibility that the 
term/risk premium on loan rates may vary as a result of changes in the degree of LP.  
 
 
3.- The model 
We now present the model we will utilize hereafter to analyze a variety of issues 
related to the impact on the level of economic activity of demand and supply shocks 
when the CB implements a conventional IT strategy. The exposition is divided into five 
subsections. The first three subsections contain the different building blocks of the 
model, the fourth subsection presents the steady-growth analysis and the final one 
describes the behaviour of the economy in the short run.  
 
3.1.- The supply side 
Let us consider a one-sector economy with two inputs, labour and capital, and 
assume that (i) there is a large number of identical firms and (ii) they all utilize the same 
technology. If we aggregate across all firms in the economy we may define potential 
output Y as: 
                                                       KvNY ⋅≤⋅= λ                                                 (4) 
where N  is the level of employment that keeps inflation constant in the absence of 
transitory supply shocks, K is the capital stock, and λ  and v are respectively the 
productivity of labour and capital when the factors are fully utilized. The current rate of 
capacity utilization is: 
                                                         1≤⋅= Kv
Yu                                                     (5) 
where Y is the actual rate of output. Post Keynesians like Rowthorn (1977) and Sawyer 
(1982) postulate the existence of a employment rate compatible with constant inflation 
in the short run (hereafter CIER) which results from the conflicting income claims of 
workers and firms.11 Thus, the CIER represents an “inflation barrier” albeit it may be 
affected by the level and time path of aggregate demand in the long run if, for instance, 
hysteresis effects are present. Be that as it may, the presence of an “inflation barrier” 
entails that the CB will seek to adjust interest rates to affect the level of economic 
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activity so as to balance off the income claims. Therefore, the rate of capacity utilization 
when YY =  is: 
                                        1≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=⋅==
K
Le
vK
N
vvK
Yu λλ                                    (6) 
where we denote by u  the “constant inflation capacity utilization” (CICU hereafter), by 
e  the CIER, by L the labour force and where LmeN ⋅= )( .12  
Let us now assume there is no overhead labour and firms are fully integrated, 
producing all the materials required for their final output so that prime costs are made 
up only of labour costs. If we also assume that firms practise mark up pricing, then the 
real (product) wage is determined by the firms’ profit-maximization objectives: 
                                            mp
w λ=                                                          (7)  
where w is the money wage, p is the price level and  is one plus the average mark 
up set by firms over prime costs,. Furthermore, in the absence of overhead labour, the 
profit share on national income 
1fm
ρ  can be expressed as (Asimakopulos, 1975): 
                             ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= λρ
pw
m
m /11                                                 (8) 
where . Hence, 0/1/ 2 fmm =∂∂ρ ρ  depends in a straightforward manner on the mark 
up over prime costs used for pricing purposes. Importantly, an increase in m — and 
hence in ρ  — reduces the CIER and vice-versa so 0pem  where the subscript denotes 
a partial derivative. This stems from the fact that, as m rises, employees need to accept a 
lower real (product) wage relative to average labour productivity if the rate of inflation 
is to be kept constant.13 If we assume that workers´ bargaining power and/or propensity 
to shirk depends inversely on the unemployment rate, then a higher m will lead to a 
higher unemployment rate in the long run. Hence, expression (6) can be re-expressed as: 
                                             1)()( ≤⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ⋅⋅⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
K
L
v
memu λ                                          (9) 
Next, as claimed in Palley (1994) and Akerlof et al. (1996), the lower the 
inflation rate, the larger is the fraction of firms which can only implement real wage 
cuts through a reduction in the money wage they pay to their workers. According to 
them, in the presence of DMWR a lower inflation rate thus implies that a larger fraction 
of firms is forced to pay real wages exceeding the wage which they deem optimal. In 
the model of Akerlof et al. (1996), this increases the long-run sustainable level of 
unemployment and provides the rationale for the existence of a “grease” effect of 
inflation on the labour market whereby a marginal rise in the inflation rate may reduce 
the equilibrium rate of unemployment when inflation is low. Yet, if firms follow a mark 
up pricing strategy and total average costs are roughly constant for a wide range of rates 
of capacity utilization the presence of DMWR is more likely to show up in a diminished 
tendency for the rate of inflation to fall for a given (negative) output-gap as inflation 
falls below a certain threshold.14 If we add the proposition that, as observed in the 
recent Japanese recession, the change in the inflation rate becomes nil (when the output-
gap is negative) as the inflation rate gets below a negative level given φπ/) , 
we obtain the expression that captures the AID
by
:  
 φπφπ( UCR−
                                  
⎩⎨
⎧
+−
+−=
)())((
)())((
muuifmuu
muuifmuu
L
U
p
f& εφ
εφπ
π
π                                 (10) 
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where            
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where επ  is a variable that captures transitory cost-push shocks and 0fπ CR  represents 
a (positive) inflation rate below which the downward adjustment of the rate of growth 
of money wages, and hence of the inflation rate, becomes slower and eventually comes 
to a halt.15 The basic proposition is that as the inflation rate decreases and falls below 
π CR , some firms will need to cut money wages if their product prices are to decrease. In 
turn, the proportion of firms that is subject to his constraint will increase as the inflation 
rate decreases further. In Akerlof et al. (1996), π CR  was estimated to be about 3 percent 
for the U.S. economy.  
Equation (10) also tells us that the inflation rate adjusts differently depending 
on: (i) whether actual capacity utilization is higher or lower than the CICU and (ii) 
whether the inflation rate is equal, higher or lower than π CR . As such, φ L  may take on 
three different values. For instance, if the current inflation rate is equal or higher than 
π CR  then inflation dynamics will be symmetric in the sense that the change in the rate of 
inflation will solely depend on the absolute value of the output-gap. If the inflation rate 
is lower than π CR  but higher than the lower threshold  then the adjustment 
of the inflation rate will be asymmetric since the change in the inflation rate will depend 
both on the size and sign of the output-gap, that is, a positive output-gap will tend to 
engender a larger (absolute) change in the inflation rate than a negative one of similar 
size. The asymmetry will be larger the closer the inflation rate is to the lower threshold. 
Finally, inflation will stop decreasing when it becomes equal to the former.            
φφφ ππ /)( UπCR−
 
3.2.- Hysteresis  
In economics, the notion of hysteresis has generated a number of different 
formal characterizations (Amable et al., 1995). Hysteresis is typically associated with 
dynamic linear models characterized by zero root systems for continuous time models 
or by unit root systems for models in discrete time (Giavazzi and Wyplosz, 1985). In 
such systems there is a continuum of equilibria and the final equilibrium reached, 
selected from within the continuum, depends on the particular features of the system. In 
a deterministic setting the final equilibrium point depends on the initial conditions of the 
state variables as well as on the parameters describing the speed of adjustment. In a 
stochastic setting, the position of the system is determined by the chronicle of 
exogenous shocks owing to the fact that the latter cumulate forever without 
progressively vanishing. According to Dutt (1997, p. 240) ‘systems of this kind can be 
called path-dependent systems’ since, in these models, history plays a key role in the 
sense that the starting point and the time path of the economy determine the final 
outcome.  
An important property of these systems is that an initial shock followed by a 
second one of the same magnitude but opposite sign drives the system back to its initial 
position. This “reversibility” property has a crucial implication. If exogenous shocks are 
generated by a symmetric probability distribution, then negative and positive shocks 
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cancel each other out in the long run. Hence, with zero/unit root systems, any long-run 
permanent effect on unemployment can solely be caused by (i) exogenous shocks that 
are generated by an asymmetric probability distribution, (ii) an asymmetric adjustment 
of prices to shocks of opposite sign or (iii) an asymmetric response to shocks by policy 
makers (Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007). In this study we will focus on the second of 
these possibilities. This “reversibility” feature of zero/unit root systems has encouraged 
some scholars to investigate the properties of systems showing hysteresis. Drawing on 
the work of the Russian mathematician Mark Krasnosel’skii, it has been argued that a 
system is hysteretic if it exhibits “remanence”, i.e., when the value of the output is 
permanently affected by an appropriate temporary change in the value of the input 
(Amable et al., 1995). The crucial point is that, in hysteretic systems, a relevant 
exogenous force modifying the value of a given parameter λ  entails a change in the 
system dynamics. For instance, the structural modification may move the system out of 
the initial equilibrium and toward a new equilibrium. By altering the exogenous force 
such as to bring parameter λ  back to the initial value, a structural deformation of equal 
magnitude but opposite sign is produced. However, and this is a crucial difference with 
the case of zero/unit root (linear) systems, the system does not return to the original 
equilibrium point. In other words, the temporary change in the value of λ  has produced 
a “remanent” effect on the final state of the system (Amable et al., 1995, p. 172; see 
also Dutt, 1997). As we show below, the presence of AID may render a zero/unit root 
system hysteretic and makes it exhibit “remanence”. However, instead of relying on an 
abstract structural modification of the system, our approach builds on Setterfield (1998) 
by (realistically) assuming the presence of asymmetries in the adjustment of inflation.       
Following a suggestion by Hargreaves Heap (1980), we model the dynamics of 
the CIER as: 
                                                   )( eee −= ζ&                 0≥ζ                             (11) 
where the overdot denotes a time derivative, 0fζ  measures the speed of adjustment of 
the CIER whenever it exhibits hysteresis effects and the case 0=ζ  corresponds to the 
case without hysteresis. Hence, we view the presence of hysteresis effects in the CIER 
as making it depend on the time path of the actual employment rate so that an increase 
in the latter tends to raise the CIER up and vice-versa.  
 
3.3.- The demand side 
The equilibrium condition in the goods markets for a closed economy with a 
government sector when current output is equal to potential output is: 
                                                  PSBRIYzrs n +=⋅),(                                          (12) 
where s is the saving rate, I is (gross) investment, PSBR is the public sector borrowing 
requirements, and z is a vector of variables to be filled below. The real interest rate in 
(12) is the neutral interest rate which we define as the real interest rate that (in a closed 
economy) makes planned saving at potential output equal to the sum of planned gross 
investment and the PSBR. It is better thought of as a long-term interest rate (Fuhrer and 
Madigan, 1997). We denote by Y the level of potential output or the level of output that 
keeps inflation constant in a given period in the absence of transitory supply shocks so 
that inflation will increase (decrease) when rr np  ( rr nf ). If we divide (12) through 
by the capital stock K, denote the net investment rate by g, the rate of depreciation of 
capital by ψ  and make b = PSBR/Y, we can rewrite (12) as: 
                                      ψ+=⋅⋅− gvmubs )()(                                         (13) 
The “natural” rate of growth is:                                                
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                                                             algn +=                                                    (14) 
where l and  are respectively the growth rate of labour force L and labour productivity a
λ . We now turn our attention to functions s and g. We assume that the saving rate s is a 
function of the rate of inflation π , the rate of growth of output , the mark up m, the 
real interest rate r and a measure of shocks 
yˆ
ε s  or:  
                                        ),,,ˆ,( επ smryss =                                                (15) 
where  cannot be signed a priori, , , , sπ 0ˆ fsy 0fsr 0fsm ε s  is a stochastic variable 
denoting shocks to the saving rate, and the subscripts denote the partial derivatives of s. 
The positive sign of derivative  stems from Marglin´s “disequilibrium hypothesis” 
(Marglin, 1984), according to which, the saving rate increases when income rises faster 
than households can adapt their spending habits whereas the opposite occurs when 
income falls faster than households can rein in their spending. The positive sign of  is 
here attributed to the presence of distribution effects. If we assume (realistically) that 
the average propensity to consume of net debtors is higher than that of net creditors, 
then a rise in the real interest rate will redistribute income away from net debtors and 
towards net creditors thereby raising the aggregate saving rate. The positive sign of  
stems from the fact that the average propensity to save out of profit income is typically 
higher than the propensity to save out of wage income owing to the fact that (i) firms 
retain a large fraction of their after-tax net profits in order to fund investment spending 
and (ii) ownership of corporate stock tends to be concentrated in the upper income 
brackets which have higher personal saving rates. Hence, s rises with m and, hence with 
s yˆ
sr
sm
ρ , and vice-versa.  
The sign of  is ambiguous. Neoclassical economists tend to assume that 
 due to the operation of a dynamic version of the “real balance” effect called the 
inflation tax whereby increases (decreases) in inflation tend to reduce (increase) the 
holdings of real balances by economic agents´ thus making them, in turn, increase 
(reduce) their saving rate in order to restore the optimum amount of real balances. The 
empirical relevance of the “real balance” effect, however, has been criticized by some 
mainstream economists.
sπ
0fsπ
16 By contrast, the case  is advocated by Keynesians who, 
taking inspiration in chapter 19 of Keynes´ General Theory (Keynes, 1936), emphasize 
the presence of “inside debt” effects which depress private spending when the price 
level falls, that is, when inflation becomes negative. However, if the case  is to be 
sound, this argument must apply also to the case when the inflation rate decreases but 
remains positive.  
0psπ
0psπ
The argument can be explained as follows. Pollin (1985) shows that the stability 
of the total outstanding debt ratio  of the U.S. economy’s non-financial 
sectors has displayed essentially no trend throughout the post-World War II period 
despite a rising marginal propensity of the aggregate non-financial sector to issue net 
new debt q . He argues that, in an inflationary environment, the nominal value of the 
debt stock remains fixed while the rate of growth of nominal GNP 
YYqS tt ˆ/)ˆ1( +=
t
Yˆ  rises, so that  is 
biased downwards. With q , current-period flow values are in both numerator and 
denominator, and thus the impact of inflation on the ratio is neutral. Because of this 
asymmetry, a rising  may not engender increases in debt burdens in an inflationary 
environment. However, for a given , a fall in the rate of inflation will increase net 
borrowers’ real debt burden and vice-versa. In the case of net borrower households, the 
reduction in the inflation rate will make them curtail consumption demand. Presumably, 
St
t
qt
qt
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this will be coupled by a rise in net lenders’ real financial wealth and, hence, by an 
increase in their consumption. Yet, the marginal propensity to consume out of wealth of 
net borrowers is higher than that of net lenders’ so that aggregate consumption will fall 
when inflation falls and vice-versa so that .  0psπ
0
Next, let´s assume that firms have a desired rate of capacity utilization  so 
they expand actual capacity when  and scale investment down when u .
1* pu
u*puu *f
* pum
17 A 
justification for this assumption is that firms operating in imperfect markets keep some 
capacity idle in order to respond rapidly to unanticipated surges in demand and to deter 
the potential entry of rivals in the industry (Spence, 1977). Following Skott (1989), we 
also assume that ) where  is the partial derivative of  with respect to 
m. The rationale for  is that, for a given value of u, the profit rate on capital is a 
positive function of 
muu (** =
0* pum
u*
ρ  and, hence, of m. Since the risk of entry in the industry of new 
rivals increases as the profit rate rises, one way to deter them is to expand idle capacity. 
These assumptions can be captured by defining the rate of accumulation, g as: 
                                                                            (16)             )),( ε gfuvg ⋅⋅= (* muu −
where  is inversely proportional to the length of the capital goods construction 
and delivery lags, 
0ff u
0)0( fff =  and ε g  captures exogenous shocks hitting g. f  is the 
ratio of net investment to output when  and captures firms´ average expected 
future rate of growth of demand. Therefore, it is affected by the state of long-term profit 
expectations. As for function b, we assume that: 
uu *=
),, επ br                                                     ,ˆ(ybb =                                                  (17) 
where the partial derivatives satisfy 0ˆ pby 0 0 here , fbr , pbπ  and w ε b  are exogenous 
shocks affecting b. The negative sign of byˆ  is due to the working of fiscal automatic 
stabilizers so its (absolute) value measures the stabilizing power of (non-discretionary) 
fiscal policy. The sign of bπ  is here attributed to the fact that tax income bases may not 
be fully indexed so that a rise in the inflation rate will tend to reduce PSBR and vice-
versa. By contrast, the positive sign of br  captures the pact on PSBR of changes in 
the flow of interest payments due to the holders of government debt resulting from 
variations in real interest rates. Finally, 
 im
ε b  captures discretio ry changes in the stance 
of fiscal policy. All this allows us to rewrite (13) as: 
na
        
)(
)),()(() ufb,,,ˆ(),,,ˆ,( * muv
mumrybmrys gnsn
ψ            (18) εεπεπ +−− =
where (18) represents the equilibrium condition in the goods market when YY = .  
 
3.4.- Steady growth analysis 
 
Steady growth equilibrium corresponds to a period of sufficient length to enable 
all the variables in the economy to settle at constant rates in the absence of new shocks. 
In a hypothetical steady growth position we have that 0=== εεε bgs , , ggy n ==ˆ
uuu *==  and ππ *=  so the following two conditions must be satisfied: 
                                                  ygf n ==mu ˆ)(* ⋅⋅v                                               (19) 
and                       [ ] ψππ +=⋅− gmubmrgs nn )(,(),,,( **** ⋅ vrgn ), *                         (20) 
where  π*  is the inflation target of the CB. Equation (19) tells us that, in steady growth, 
the rate of accumulation must equal the “natural” rate of growth. Equation (20) is the 
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counterpart to equation (18) for the steady growth equilibrium. In order to get a solution 
for the steady growth neutral interest rate r*  we assume that functions s and b adopt a 
linear form or: 
                                             msrssysss mry ++++= ππˆˆ                                    (21) 
and                                            rbybbbb ry ++π+= ˆˆπ                                         (22) 
where s  is a shift term determined by individuals´ preferences, institutional factors and 
the degree of LP and b  denotes the stance of fiscal policy. Substituting equations (21) 
and (22) into (20) and re-arranging we arrive at: 
                                  
c
mscgc yˆcmuv
g
r
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n 1
)(
*
1*
* ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−−−⋅
+= πψ πr                            (23) 
where bsc −=1  and π  cannot be signed a prior 0bsc ππ −= i, ˆˆˆ fbsc yyy −=  and, for 
the sake of the argument, we assume th 0fat bs rr= −cr . Thus, r*  depends inter alia on 
the “natural” rate of growth, the target rate of inflation, the aggregate saving rate, the 
stance of fiscal policy and the average mark up, and it can be interpreted as the real 
interest rate where ‘all markets are in equilibrium and there is therefore no pressure for 
any resources to be redistributed or growth rates for any variables to change’ (Archibald 
and Hunter, 2001, p. 20). Furthermore, r*  also represents the real interest rate that is 
compatible with a neutral monetary policy in the long run and, therefore, it is akin to the 
neutral interest rate embedded in Taylor´s rule (1993). The steady growth properties are: 
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 The ambiguous sign of (24) stems from the contradictory effects on aggregate 
demand of a change in the inflation rate. In principle, the sign of (25) is also ambiguous. 
However, it will be positive and close to unity for reasonable values of the parameters 
of the model. The positive sign of (26) reflects the fact that an increase in s pushes r*  
down whereas an increase in b raises aggregate demand and, hence, r* . The ambiguous 
sign of (27) is here attributed to the fact that a change in m, and hence in ρ , affects the 
accumulation rate and the saving rate with contradictory effects on aggregate demand. 
Starting with Bhaduri and Marglin (1990), it is common usage to distinguish between a 
“wage-led” regime and a “profit-led” regime. In the former, an increase in the wage 
share leads to an increase in aggregate demand whereas, in the latter, an increase in the 
wage share reduces aggregate demand. Thus, we say that the economy is in a “wage-
led” regime if (27) is negative and in a “profit-led” regime if the opposite holds. In 
short, the functional distribution of income along with the inflation target, the aggregate 
saving rate, the “natural” growth rate and the fiscal policy stance determines r*  and, 
hence, the likelihood of the occurrence of an aggregate demand deficiency problem (for 
a given degree of LP). An increase (decrease) in the mark up when the economy is 
“profit-led” (“wage-led”) renders it less likely that the economy exhibits an aggregate 
demand deficiency and vice-versa.  
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3.5.- Short-run dynamics 
Steady growth equilibrium is only valid for explaining a hypothetical long-run 
scenario where the effects of shocks and lags have already worked themselves out. 
Admittedly, that scenario is unrealistic because an economy is constantly being shocked 
away from its steady growth equilibrium. Yet, the steady growth analysis provides an 
equilibrium outcome around which the economy hovers in the short run and may offer 
some insights. Next, we analyse the behaviour of the economy in the short run where 
the former is defined as the time it takes for the real interest rate to affect inflation. As 
before, we assume that the investment function f adopts a linear form or: 
                                  ))(()),(( ** muuffmuuf ug −⋅+=− ε                             (28) 
Substituting (28) into (18) and re-arranging we obtain the rate of growth of 
output : yˆ
                         
vucc
muufrccmscfy
yy
urm
ˆˆ
*
1 ))((ˆ ψππ +−⋅+−−−−=                    (29) 
A solution for rn  can be obtained by setting uu =  in (29) and rearranging: 
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muv
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ψ  and 0pu m .  
First, expression (31) highlights that a change in the CICU has an ambiguous 
impact upon rn . This is because, an increase in the CICU and, hence, in Y , brings 
about an increase in the flow of private saving at the higher level of output that may or 
may not be offset by the resulting higher rate of investment. If , the increase in 
the flow of saving will not be offset by the higher rate of investment and vice-versa. The 
standard textbook assumption that at the margin private saving is more responsive than 
investment to changes in capacity utilisation for making the Keynesian income 
adjustment process stable requires imposing a negative sign on . Second, we may 
note that the factors that affect 
02 pc
c2
rn  differ from the factors affecting r* . For instance, a 
change in the functional distribution of income affect r*  through a demand-side channel 
but, as (32) highlights, it affects rn  through a supply-side channel (i.e., by altering u ). 
This is because demand shocks affect output growth in the short run and, in turn, the 
latter affects the saving rate so that the initial impact of the demand shock on rn — but 
not the corresponding supply shock that occurs through the induced change in u — is 
fully offset by the subsequent variation in the saving rate. Since output growth is equal 
to the “natural” growth rate in steady growth, the supply-side effect disappears in the 
long run thus letting the demand shock reappear.      
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4.- Transient dynamics  
 The next question we address is the stability of the adjustment process to the 
new equilibrium after being shocked away in an economy described by the model 
postulated above. We want to make sure, as Joan Robinson would put it, that the fully-
adjusted positions can be reached in historical time. If so, this will imply a successful 
“traverse” from one path to another (Hicks, 1965, p. 184). To simplify the discussion, 
we will sidestep the problem that the adjustment process may be short-circuited if the 
zero lower bound constraint binds at any time and will focus instead on the possibility 
that the new equilibrium may be unstable even when the zero lower bound constraint 
does not bind. First, we analyze the stability of the long-run equilibrium when the 
economy does exhibit neither hysteresis effects nor AID and, then, we discuss whether 
and how the previous results are affected when the economy does exhibit these two 
features.    
 
4.1.- Transient dynamics without hysteresis and AID 
In this section we show that an economy described by the model expounded 
above and that is not subject to the zero lower bound constraint at any time during the 
adjustment process successfully reaches a new steady growth position provided certain 
conditions are met. This issue is rather technical so we tackle it in detail in appendix A 
where we analyse formally the (local) stability of a non-linear dynamic system extracted 
from the model presented above when the CB sets real interest rates according to the 
following Taylor-type policy rule:18 
                                                                                              (33) )()( ** ππα −+= mrr
where α  is the response coefficient of monetary policy to changes in the inflation gap, 
i.e., the difference between the actual and the target inflation rate. We show below that, 
for a wide range of parameter values, equilibrium  is (locally) 
stable if the following three conditions are satisfied:  
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Conditions (34) and (36) are satisfied for the set of parameter values chosen for 
the simulation exercise (see table 1 below) so the economy will be (locally) stable if: 
                                                  
c
c
r
παα −=f *  
This means that, if , then response coefficient 0fcπ α  does not need to satisfy 
Taylor´s principle (Taylor, 1993) (i.e., that 0fα ) to render the economy locally stable. 
By contrast, if , satisfying Taylor´s principle does not guarantee the stability of 
the system. Since  by assumption, the sign of 
0pcπ
pbπ 0 bsc ππ π −=  depends on the sign 
and size of  as well as on the size of . Therefore, if the CB is to provide a nominal 
anchor to the economy, then it will have to be more responsive to changes in the actual 
inflation rate if the Keynesian “debt” effect dominates ( ) than if the Neoclassical 
“inflation tax” effect prevails ( ). In other words, whether the economy exhibits a 
Keynesian or a Neoclassical regime affects 
sπ bπ
0pcπ
0fcπ
α *  but does not have further repercussions 
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on economic stability as long as αα *f  and the zero lower bound does not bind. 
Moreover, we have that: 
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Expression (37) tells us that a change in the desired degree of capacity utilization 
 brought about, for instance, by a change in m may, in principle, make  locally 
unstable — if it makes  become positive — albeit our own calculations based on the 
parameter values shown in table 1 suggest that the change would have to be extremely 
large for this to be the case. We may also note that partial derivative  does not show 
up in the stability conditions above. Thus, changes in m and, hence, in the functional 
distribution of income, cannot undermine the stability of . In turn, this means that 
whether the economy exhibits a “wage-led” or a “profit-led” regime is irrelevant for 
macroeconomic stability provided the zero lower bound constraint does not bind. 
However, the distribution regime the economy exhibits remains an important datum 
since, as noted above, it affects 
u∗ P*
Δ1
sm
P*
r*  and, hence, the likelihood that an aggregate demand 
deficiency occurs. Finally, expression (38) is rather similar to expressions (31) and (32). 
It tells us that, for example, an increase in the stabilizing power of fiscal automatic 
stabilizers  and, hence, in c , apparently has an ambiguous effect on the sign of byˆ yˆ Δ1 . 
Notwithstanding it, if we look at (34), we see that an increase in  actually renders 
 less likely hence reinforcing stability. Thus, as conventional wisdom has it, the 
more powerful automatic stabilizers are the more stable the economy becomes. 
cyˆ
0f1Δ
  
4.2.- Transient dynamics with hysteresis and AID 
 We now address the consequences for macroeconomic stability of the presence 
of hysteresis effects and AID. To do so, we need to derive three additional equations for 
simulation purposes. First, the presence of hysteresis effects means that the CIER is 
now determined by the time path of the employment rate and that, in turn, changes in 
the CIER affect the CICU as depicted in expression (9). If the take logarithms in (9) and 
differentiate it with respect to time we get:  
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)(                                       (39) 
Next, in order to capture the presence of a zero lower bound constraint on 
nominal interest rates we need to rewrite the expression that depicts the behaviour of the 
real interest rate. As before, we assume that the CB knows r*  and that it sets (real) 
interest rates according to policy rule (33) so that:  
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Therefore, the (long-term) actual real interest rate is determined by a Taylor-type 
monetary policy rule when the zero bound constraint does not bind or else is equal to 
the difference between the term/risk premium on long-term rates and the inflation rate. 
Finally, differentiation of (5) yields equation (42) in appendix A which describes the 
dynamics of capacity utilization. Hence, the model we will use for simulation purposes 
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is made up of the following equations: (10), (11), (14), (16), (23), (28), (29), (39), (40) 
and (42). Simulation results are shown in figures 1 through 22 in appendix B. Table 1 
contains the parameter values, the initial conditions and the values of the operators 
describing the stability conditions. Parameter values are justified in appendix B. Tables 
2 and 3 summarize the different shocks and scenarios considered in each simulation 
exercise. The second column in tables 2 and 3 explain the type of shock analysed in 
each exercise whereas the third column identifies those parameter values of each 
exercise that differ from the values reported in table 1.       
 
4.2.1.- The impact on macroeconomic volatility 
Figures 1 through 3 show the behaviour of the inflation rate, capacity utilization 
and the employment rate in the aftermath of an adverse shock to the inflation rate when 
the economy exhibits neither hysteresis effects nor AID. For the set of parameter values 
reported in table 1 the economy exhibits self-sustained oscillations. The former are the 
result of the interplay in a non-linear context of an (unstable) multiplier-accelerator 
mechanism and the stabilizing behaviour of real interest rates. Figures 4 through 6 show 
the time-path of the same variables when the economy exhibits hysteresis effects. The 
presence of hysteresis dampens oscillations. This is because, when the employment rate 
decreases, the CIER decreases along with it and this, in turn, cushions the downward 
pressure on the inflation rate. Conventional wisdom suggests that this “cushion” effect 
should weaken rather than reinforce macroeconomic stability because, as inflation 
decreases, the CB will lower interest rates and this will spur aggregate spending thereby 
helping to reverse the initial shock. However, the simulation exercise shows that, at 
least in the context of our model, the presence of hysteresis ameliorates macroeconomic 
volatility. The simulation exercise also revealed that the higher parameter ζ  is the more 
dampened oscillations become. Further, figures 7 through 9 suggest that the presence of 
AID also tends to dampen oscillations. In short, the presence of hysteresis and AID 
appears to reinforce the stabilizing power of monetary policy.  
 
4.2.2.- The impact of shocks to the inflation rate  
As is well-known, the existence of (unit-root) hysteresis implies that persistent 
but nevertheless transitory shocks may have permanent effects on the economy. For 
instance, figure 6 shows that a disinflation process in the wake of an adverse shock that 
raised the inflation rate above its target ( ) imposes on the economy a 
permanently lower employment rate. However, as pointed out, systems exhibiting (unit-
root) hysteresis also possess the “reversibility” property. Following with the previous 
example, this means that if the economy is subject to a shock of the same intensity but 
opposite sign (e.g. ), the employment rate now stabilizes at a higher 
level (see figure 16). Importantly, the long-run decrease in the employment rate brought 
about by the unfavourable shock is equal to the long-run increase brought about by the 
favourable supply shock.    
ππ *0 035.0 f=
ππ *0 005.0 p=
Next, we address the consequences for unemployment of inflation shocks when 
the economy exhibits hysteresis effects and AID.19 In figure 14, the disinflation process 
brought about by an adverse inflation shock makes the employment rate settle at 0.884 
in the long run, well below its initial level at 0.9. By contrast, in the wake of a shock of 
equal intensity but opposite sign the employment rate stabilizes at 0.908 (see figure 15) 
so the “reversibility” property typically exhibited by zero/unit root systems is violated. 
The existence of a negative bias to the employment rate is confirmed in the stochastic 
simulation exercise depicted in figures 17 through 19. Figure 17 shows the time path of 
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the employment rate when the economy is subject to a sequence of random inflation 
shocks επ . The latter were generated by a normal probability distribution of zero mean 
and standard deviation equal to 0.0096 (see figure 19). In the absence of AID, the 
employment rate rapidly drops off and converges to zero. Figure 18 shows the 
replication of the exercise when the economy exhibits hysteresis effects and AID. The 
employment rate now fluctuates around a decreasing trend. Therefore, as far as inflation 
are concerned, the presence of hysteresis effects and AID reinforces macroeconomic 
stability, blocks off the “reversibility” property and, crucially, it imparts a long-term 
negative bias on the employment rate in the sense that, if the economy is initially at 
equilibrium and is subjected to a unfavourable supply shock that raises the inflation rate 
and this is subsequently followed by a second shock of the same intensity but in the 
opposite direction then the employment rate does not return to the initial equilibrium but 
stabilizes at a lower level. 
 
4.2.3.- The impact of demand shocks 
 We now investigate the long-run effect on the employment rate of demand 
shocks when the CIER exhibits hysteresis effects. This affects to shocks associated to 
changes in the functional distribution of income as well as to shocks associated to 
changes in the private saving rate and fiscal policy. The presence of an inflation-
targeting CB implies that the short-run impact of a demand shock will be, at least 
partially, offset by changes in real interest rates. This is because the demand shock 
affects r*  and, if the CB periodically updates its estimate of r* , the impact on AD is 
offset by a change in the real interest rate.20 For instance, if the CB sets interest rates 
according to a Taylor-type policy rule like (35) then, a rise (fall) in m when the 
economy is “profit-led” (“wage-led”) (i.e., a favourable demand shock) prompts an 
upward revision of r*  and, hence, an increase in the actual real interest rate. Figures 10 
and 11 depict the long-run impact on the employment rate of an increase and a decrease 
in m respectively when the economy is “profit-led”. In the former case, the increase in 
m leads to a decrease in  that stimulates investment spending and, hence, to an 
increase in 
u*
r*  whereas, in the latter case, the opposite holds.21 The simulation exercise 
confirmed that, in the absence of AID, shocks do not affect the employment rate in the 
long run. In particular, demand shocks determine the time path of the employment rate 
but do not affect the level at which it settles in the long run which is equal to the initial 
(supply-determined) one.  
Next, we analyse how the previous results vary when there is both hysteresis 
effects and AID. Figure 12 shows the case of a favourable demand shock whereas figure 
13 shows the case of an unfavourable one. In both cases, the employment rate settles 
below its initial level at 0.9, albeit the long-term decrease is clearly more marked when 
the shock is unfavourable. Therefore, the presence of AID makes demand shocks have 
an adverse long-term impact on the employment rate even when they are expansionary. 
This is confirmed in the stochastic simulation exercise depicted in figures 20 through 
22. As with inflation shocks, we subject the aggregate saving rate to random shocks ε s  
drawn from a normal probability distribution of zero mean and standard deviation equal 
to 0.0084 (see figure 22). Figure 20 shows the time path of the employment rate when 
the economy (only) exhibits hysteresis effects whereas figure 21 shows its time path 
when the economy exhibits hysteresis effects and AID. In the former case, the 
employment rate hovers in the short run around a stationary trend whereas, in the latter 
case, the employment rate exhibits a declining trend. In short, demand shocks are 
neutralized by changes in real interest rates induced by the CB so they do affect the 
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employment rate in the short run but do not affect it in the long run unless the economy 
exhibits AID; in this latter case they affect it adversely even when shocks are 
expansionary. 
To finish off this section let us recall that a change in m gives rise to a short-run 
change in the actual inflation rate, a permanent demand shock (of ambiguous sign), and 
an initial supply shock represented by a change in the CIER. The upshot of the previous 
discussion was that, if the economy exhibits hysteresis effects and AID, the interaction 
of short-run changes in the inflation rate and demand shocks will lead to a lower 
employment rate in the long run. To these effects, we need to add the initial favourable 
(unfavourable) supply shock when m decreases (increases) which will bring about an 
increase (decrease) in the CIER. If m increases, the (initial) reduction in the CIER will 
exacerbate the long-run negative bias imparted on the employment rate by the two 
previous effects. By contrast, if m decreases, the net long-run effect on the employment 
rate becomes uncertain and depends on the relative strength of the three separate effects.        
 
5.- Summary and conclusion 
In this study we analysed the long-run impact on the employment rate of a  
change in the degree of monopoly power as measured by the average mark up in an 
economy characterized by the existence of (i) a short-run “inflation barrier” referred to 
as the “constant inflation employment rate” (CIER) that may exhibit hysteresis effects, 
(ii) a central bank (CB) that sets interest rates in order to hit an inflation target and (iii) 
the presence of “asymmetric inflation dynamics” (AID) put down to the existence of 
downward money wage rigidity. For that purpose, we postulated a macroeconomic 
model for a closed economy with a government sector that incorporates the above-
mentioned features. We identified three different effects of a change in the average 
mark up: (i) a permanent change in the level of aggregate demand stemming from a 
change in the functional distribution of income, (ii) an initial change in the CIER and 
(iii) a short-run variation in the inflation rate.  
We obtained several results. First, we found that, in an economy characterized 
by the above features except AID, a change in the mark up only affects the employment 
rate in the long run insofar as the former initially affects the CIER and the inflation rate. 
In particular, an increase in the average mark up leads to a decrease in the employment 
rate and vice-versa. We argued that this occurs because the permanent demand shock 
brought about by the change in the functional distribution of income leads to a change 
in the steady growth neutral interest rate and this, in turn, is passed through into the 
actual real interest rate by virtue of the monetary policy rule of the CB. Thus, in this 
scenario a change in the mark up only leads to a long-run increase in the employment 
rate when it contracts.  
Second, we showed that, when the economy also exhibits AID, a change in the 
average mark up is less effective and may even be counterproductive. This is because 
the long-run impact on the employment rate of the demand shock, even when it is 
expansionary, is adverse. Therefore, in this second scenario, an increase in the average 
mark up, even when coupled by an expansionary demand shock, always leads to a long-
run decrease in the employment rate. Further, a decrease in the mark up only brings 
about a long-run increase in the employment rate if the net adverse effect of the 
permanent demand shock (even it is expansionary) is more than offset by the sum of the 
favourable effects stemming from the initial reduction in the inflation rate and the rise in 
the CIER. More generally, we showed by means of a sequence of simulation exercises 
that the joint presence of hysteresis and AID in the type of economy sketched above (i) 
attenuates macroeconomic volatility and (ii) blocks off the “reversibility” property 
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exhibited by zero/unit root systems in the wake of inflation shocks. Third, we found 
that, whether the economy exhibits a “wage-led” or a “profit-led” macroeconomic 
regime is irrelevant for macroeconomic performance as long as the economy does not 
exhibit an aggregate demand deficiency problem. 
Fourth, we argued that, despite the importance of the above results, this does not 
mean that changes in the functional distribution of income may not affect 
macroeconomic performance favourably. In this respect, we showed that the functional 
distribution of income affects the neutral interest rate in the short run and in the long run 
and, thus, it affects the probability that the economy exhibits an aggregate demand 
deficiency. We then argued that, although proponents of the NC approach may 
eventually accept that the functional distribution of income is one potential factor 
affecting aggregate demand and, hence, the neutral interest rate, they nevertheless reject 
the notion that it affects the steady growth neutral interest rate since they assume that 
the latter is mainly determined by the (positive) rate of time preference of the 
representative household and the “natural” growth rate. As a result of it, they fail to 
perceive the potentially beneficial impact of the functional distribution of income on 
macroeconomic performance. We then argued that liquidity preference theory precludes 
the existence of a positive lower threshold to the steady growth neutral interest rate and 
this, in turn, implies that factors like the fiscal policy stance, the functional distribution 
of income, and the degree of liquidity preference are determinants of macroeconomic 
performance.                   
Lastly, we distinguished between a Keynesian regime and a Neoclassical regime 
according to whether an increase in the inflation rate leads to an increase (Keynesian) or 
to a decrease (Neoclassical) in the neutral interest rate and showed that the regime the 
economy exhibits determines the condition that the monetary policy rule of the CB must 
satisfy to provide a nominal anchor to the economy. A corollary of our analysis was that 
Taylor´s principle may not hold when changes in the inflation rate affect aggregate 
demand directly. 
   
Appendix A 
This appendix deals with the computation of the equilibrium points and stability 
conditions of the dynamical system that results from the economic model postulated in 
section 3. For the sake of the argument, we make a number of simplifying assumptions. 
First, we assume that the CB knows r* . Second, we impose the conditions φφ LU =  and 
))(/( * muvgf n ⋅= . The former means that we assume the economy does not exhibit AID 
whereas the latter means that firms´ output growth expectations are firmly anchored to 
its secular growth rate so we remove any instability that may result from changes in 
firms´ profit expectations. Admittedly, this provides the economy with a built-in 
stabilizing mechanism but it certainly makes the system much easier to handle. Third, 
we assume that r*  is positive and high enough so as to make the zero lower bound not 
bind. Finally, the analysis focuses on the local stability of the economy. Taking these 
limitations into account, we have that:  
                                                              gy
u
u −= ˆ&                                                  (42) 
and substituting (16), (28), (29) and (33) into (42) yields: 
                                                              ),( πuhu =&                                                (43) 
 Next, if we assume that 0=ζ (i.e., the CIER does not exhibit hysteresis), we can 
rewrite (39) as: 
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 (16) and then into (44) yields: 
           
and substituting (28) into
                            [ ]))((( * muuffuvguu un −⋅+⋅⋅−⋅=&                          (
Therefore, our dynamical system is made up of equations (1
45) 
0) — with φφ LU =  
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ndo´s formula (see Gantmacher, 1954, p. 197): 
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where the 
0Δ
λ′s are the eigenvalues of the (linearized) dynamical system, δ  is the re part 
of the complex conjugate eigenvalues, 1
al 
Δ = Tr J( ) , 2Δ = Det J( ) , 3 11 22 33Δ = + +J J J , 
4 1 3 2Δ Δ Δ Δ= − +  and J is the Jacobian matrix of the linearized system. In turn, the iiJ  are 
the principal minors (of order 2) of J, i.e., the determinants of the matrices that are 
obtained after deleting the i-th row and the i-th column. Thus, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for the non-linear system made up of equations (10), (43) and (45) to be 
locally asymptotically stable is:     
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As a result of it, the stability of the system requires that conditions 0fcc r
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 απ + , 
01 pΔ  and 04 fΔ  be satisfied. Furthermore, there exists a value α *  of the response 
coefficient of the monetary policy rule of th CB for whic  loe h the  
y obtain 
cal stability of the
.  system changes dramatically. We ma α *  by setting 04 =Δ
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so the system will be unstable if αα p  and vice-versa. 
 
Appendix B 
The simulation exercise was aimed at exploring the implications of the existence 
of hysteresis and AID. Table 1 reports the values of the parameters of the model, 
including 
*
r*  and f , and the initial conditions whereas tables 2 and 3 report the values 
of those parameters and initial conditions whose values may differ in successive 
simulation exer  those reported in table 1. The parameters and initial 
conditions responsible for the single shock are underlined. For the sake of convenience, 
we assume that 
cises from
0== us mm . The values of the parameters were chosen according to the 
values typically reported in the literature. For instance, the inflation target for many CBs 
is 2 per cent. The literature usually reports that the technical output-ca tal ratio v is 
about 0.3. Studies for the U.S. economy suggest that the CICU is about 82 percent (see 
Garner, 1994 and Corrado and Mattey, 1997) and the value assigned to 
pi
φU  stems from 
results in McElhattan (1985) who finds that, for each percentage point that capacity 
utilization exceeds 82 percent, inflation accelerates by about 0.15 percentage points. As 
for π CR , fwe ollow Akerlof et al. (1996) and assume that the presence of DMWR starts 
to bite when the actual inflation rate is less than 3 percent. This implies that, if 4=φπ  
and 15.0=φU , the inflation rate ceases to decrease when it is equal to -0.0075 which is 
roughly the level at which the Japanese inflation rate settled after 1998. Next, the 
resulting value for the short-term real interest rate — taking into account that r*  is a 
long-term interest rate and so we need to subtract the term premium to obtain the former 
— is roughly the value of the real federal funds rate over the 1960-1998 period in the 
U.S.: 2.55 percent (Reifschneider and Williams, 2000, p. 950). As for the parameters in 
the saving and investment function, we set them so as to render the economy stable and, 
as mentioned above, we set f  equal to its steady growth value to make the model easier 
to handle. The standard deviation of the normal distributions used to generate a set of 
random inflation and demand shocks were taken from Orphanides and Wieland (2000, 
p. 1373) who estimate a three-equations NC-type model for the Euro area for the period 
1976-1998 and report a standard deviation of inflation and demand shocks equal to 0.96 
and 0.84 respectively. Finally, the subscripts of the variables in table 1 denote the values 
that the parameters adopt in different simulation exercises.        
 
015.00, =f u  5.2=cr  3.02 =ζ  8.000* === uuu  03.0=gn  
3.01, =f u  1.0−=cπ  0== us mm  04.0=*α 5.0=α  60.1/* )=∂∂ gr n  
02.0* =π  00,0 == φπ πCR  03.01 =π CR   9.000 == ee  12210.01 −=Δ  
14.01 =c  15.0=φU  41, =φπ  3.0=v  00302.02 −=Δ  
03.02 −=c  00 =ζ   125.0=f  035.0=ψ  092.03 =Δ  
5.1ˆ =cy  1.01 =ζ  01.0=μ  035.0* =r  Δ 029957.04 =  
Table 1: Parameter values, initial conditions and operators 
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Pa r from those Fig. Sin ck gle sho rameter values (when they differeported in table 1) 
Fig. 1 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Absence of hysteresis and AID: 035.00 =π  
Fig. 2 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Absence of hysteresis and AID: 035.00 =π  
Fig. 3 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Absence of hysteresis and AID: 0 =π 035.0  
Fig. 4 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Hysteresis, no AID: 035.00 =π  and 1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 5 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Hysteresis, no AID: 035.00 =π  and 1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 6 Unfavourable inflation shock 
Hysteresis, no AID 5: 03.00 =π  and 1 = 1.0ζ  
Fig. 7 Unfavourable inflation 
AID, no hysteresis:
shock 
 035.00 =π , 03.01 =π CR  and 
41, =φπ  
Fig. 8 Unfavourable inflation 
AID, no hysteresis:
shock 
 035.00 =π , 03.01 =π CR  and 
41, =φπ  
Fig. 9 Unfavourable inflation 
AID, no hysteresis:
shock 
 035.00 =π , 03.01 =π CR  and 
41, =φπ  
Fig. 10 Expansionary demand 
Hysteresis, no AID
shock 
: * =u 75.0  , 3.01, =f u , 
02.00 =π  an .d 302 =ζ  
Fig. 11 
Hysteresis, no AIDContractionary 
demand shock 
: * =u 85.0 , 3.01, =f u , 
02.00 =π  and 3.02 =ζ  
Fig. 12 Expansionary demand 
Hysteresis and AID: 
shock 
75.0* =u , ,f u 03 02.0=π ,.01 = ,  
03.01 =π CR , 41, =φπ  an 3.d 02 =ζ  
Fig. 13 
Hysteresis and AID:Contractionary 
demand shock 
85.0* =u , ,f u 3 02.00 =π ,.01 = ,  
03.01 =π CR , 41, =φπ  and .02 = 3ζ  
Fig. 14 Unfavourable inflation 
Hysteresis and AID: 
shock 
035.00 =π , 03.01 =π CR , 41, =φπ  
and 1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 15 Favourable inflation 
Hysteresis and AID
shock 
: 0 005.0=π , 03.01 =π CR , 41, =φπ  
and 1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 16 Favourable inflation shock 
Hysteresis, no AID: 005.00 =π  and 1 = 1.0  ζ
Note: The parameters underlined in the third column are the ones that trigger the shock 
Table 2: Summary of parameter v itions in the simulation exercises 
with a single shock 
 
alues and initial cond
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Fig. Shocks Parameter va r from those lues (when they differeported in table 1) 
Fig. 17 Stochastic inflation Hysteresis, no AID:shocks 
 02.00 =π  and 3.02 =ζ  
Fig. 18 Stochastic inflation 
Hysteresis and AID
shocks 
: 0 02.0=π π, 0.01 =CR ,3  41, =φπ  
and 1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 19 Stochastic inflation Drawn from a normal distribution shocks 
Fig. 20 Stochastic demand Hysteresis, no AID:shocks 
 02.00 =π  and  1.01 =ζ  
Fig. 21 Stochastic demand 
Hysteresis and AID:
shocks 
 0 02.0=π , 03.01 =π CR , 41, =φπ  
and .0 11 =ζ  
Fig. 22 the saving rate Drawn from a normal distribution 
Stochastic shocks to 
Table 3: Summary of par  the simulation exercises 
with a stochastic sequence of shocks 
 
ameter values and initial conditions in
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Fig. 2: Capacity utilization 
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0,75
0,76
0,77
0,78
0,79
0,8
0,81
1 7 13 19 25 31 37 43 49 55 61 67 73 79 85 91 97 103 109 115 121 127 133 139 145 151 157 163 169 175 181 187 193 199 205 211 217 223 229 235 241 247 253
Per i ods
Fig. 5: Capacity utilization 
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Fig. 6: Employment rate 
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Fig. 7: Inflation rate 
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Fig. 8: Capacity utilization 
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Fig. 9: Employment rate 
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Fig. 10: Employment rate 
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  Fig. 12: Employment rate  
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Fig. 13: Employment rate  
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Fig. 14: Employment rate  
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Fig. 15: Employment rate  
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Fig. 16: Employment rate  
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Fig. 17: Employment rate  
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Fig. 18: Employment rate  
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 Fig. 19: Supply shocks 
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1 Examples of the rapidly growing empirical literature on this topic are the studies by Bowles and Boyer 
(1995), Gordon (1995), Hein and Ochsen (2003), Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), Naastepad (2006), 
Naastepad and Storm (2006/07), Hein and Vogel (2007) and Stockhammer et al. (2007).  
 
2 Detailed expositions of the NC approach can be found in Clarida et al. (1999) and Meyer (2001) and 
two recent critical reviews are in Arestis and Sawyer (2006, 2008).  
  
3 In this respect, Krugman (1998) argues that the negative output-gap the Japanese economy exhibited in 
the late 1990s was largely underestimated in official statistics. He adds that it could have been as large as 
8 per cent of GDP and it may have grown much larger since 1998.  
 
4 For instance, Mourougane and Ibaragi (2004) estimate Phillips curves for Japan and find evidence that 
at low or negative inflation rates, indicators of demand pressure have no statistically significant effect on 
price inflation.  
 
5 Of course, current output may also fall short of potential output if the CB purposively sets the real 
interest rate above the neutral real interest rate in order to trigger a disinflation process. Thus, by an 
aggregate demand deficiency we mean a situation where the CB cannot make current output equal to 
potential even if the short-term nominal interest rate is equal to zero.     
 
6 This definition of the neutral interest rate differs from Keynes´ (1936, p. 243) one in that he views the 
former as the long-term interest rate that yields full-employment whereas we define it as the long-term 
interest rate that yields an employment rate that keeps inflation constant.  
 
7 We thus believe, as Keynes (1936, p. 173), that between monetary policy and economic activity ‘there 
may be several slips between the cup and the lip’. 
 
8 For this particular example we assume “constant relative risk aversion” preferences of the representative 
household and that the utility of each future generation is weighted equally irrespective of size.  
 
9 The classical presentation of the notion of the natural interest rate is in Wicksell (1936[1898]).    
 
10 This third meaning is emphasized in Cassel (1928).  
 
11 This feature of PK theory is emphasized in Stockhammer (2007). He notes that ‘as a theory of inflation 
the NAIRU model resembles the conflict inflation theory of Post Keynesian origin. This theory… reflects 
Post Keynesians long-standing conviction that inflation is the outcome of distributional conflict (and not 
excessive growth in the money supply) and thus has to be combated through incomes policies’ 
(Stockhammer, 2008, p. 495).   
 
12 The non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment or NAIRU is hence equal to e−1 . In this study, 
we assume that the CIER is equivalent to the notion of “equilibrium unemployment”. The latter refers to a 
rate of unemployment that is determined at the intersection of a price-setting function and an upward-
sloping wage-setting function in real wage-employment space. Admittedly, a substantive difference 
between these two concepts is that the NAIRU is typically defined as a situation where the rate of 
inflation is constant, whereas the only requirement of the concept of “equilibrium unemployment” is that 
real wages are constant (when there is no productivity growth) or else grow at the same pace than 
productivity. Yet, the two approaches can be reconciled by grafting money wage and price dynamics onto 
the static approach (see Lindbeck, 1993, Appendix B),   
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13 In terms of the concept of “equilibrium unemployment” alluded to above, a rise in m will lead to a 
leftward shift in the price-setting curve and, hence, to a higher rate of “equilibrium unemployment”.  
  
14 Evidence for AID is provided in Peltzman (2000). Unlike in a perfectly competitive economy, in an 
imperfectly competitive one the price-setting curve may not be negatively-sloped so that, for the relevant 
range of the curve, there may be a neutral or even a positive relationship between the employment rate 
and the real (product) wage. The former implies that, in the presence of DMWR, an increase in the real 
(product) wage paid by the firms once the actual inflation rate is low or negative may not necessarily 
result in a higher level of “equilibrium unemployment”.     
 
15 Hence, the long-term real interest rate exhibits an upper bound equal to whenever the 
short-term nominal interest rate is zero and the inflation rate becomes negative.  
 
16 A pertinent rebuttal to the official position is in Greenwald and Stiglitz (1993) who, referring to the 
“real balance” effect, point out that ‘quantitatively, it is surely an nth order effect; one calculation put it 
that, even at the fastest rate at which prices fell in the Great Depression, it would take more than two 
centuries to restore the economy to full employment. And in the short run even its sign is ambiguous, as 
inter-temporal substitution effects may (depending on expectations) more than offset the wealth effects’ 
(Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1993, p.36). 
 
17 In general, an asterisk denotes the steady growth value of the variable. However, in the case of u its 
steady growth value coincides with the desired rate of capacity utilization. Likewise, the target inflation 
rate coincides with the steady growth value of the inflation rate.  
  
18 An interest rate policy rule like this one can be easily derived from a loss function according to which 
the CB seeks to minimize the deviation of the actual inflation rate and actual level of output from their 
respective target levels (see, for instance, Carlin and Soskice, 2005). 
  
19 Henceforth, an “inflation shock” is a shock to the inflation rate that does not affect the CIER. 
 
20 In this study we assume that the CB estimates the steady growth neutral interest rate correctly in order 
to frame our results in the most favourable scenario for the implementation of monetary policy decisions. 
Of course, we readily admit that any CB faces enormous practical difficulties when estimating it (see, for 
instance, Weber et al., 2008).  
   
21 Let us note that, for the sake of simplicity, we assume that =sm . 
 
22 See the Routh-Hurwitz conditions for the stability of dynamical systems in Gandolfo (1997, pp. 219-
23).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
